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COMMENTS
The Evolving Role of Federal Courts in
Domestic Fisheries Management
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 20, 2004, the United States Commission on Ocean
Policy1 presented Congress with the most significant proposal for ocean
governance reform since the mid-1970s. 2 Included among the 212 rec-
ommendations set forth by the Commission were a series of proposals
designed to fundamentally alter the current fisheries management struc-
ture. During the past fifteen years, as global and domestic fish stocks
declined, the management system created by the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act (FCMA) 3 has come under intense scrutiny and
criticism from conservation groups, academics, and industry alike.
Though management of open-access resources has long been recognized
as an economic, social, and political challenge,4 the system of govern-
ance currently in place with respect to domestic fisheries has in large
part failed to successfully maintain viable fish populations. In the ten-
sion between short-term economic considerations and long-term sus-
tainability, short-term considerations have generally prevailed.
Conservation and environmental groups, without a significant voice in
the decision-making process under the FCMA, have recently turned to
the courts in an effort to enforce statutory conservation mandates under
the FCMA. While this strategy has often resulted in injunctions prevent-
ing the National Marine Fisheries Service from promulgating certain
management plans,5 in certain instances, the use of litigation has also
placed courts in the position of de facto fishery managers.
This Comment examines the evolving role of courts in domestic
1. The Commission on Ocean Policy was established by the Oceans Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-256, 114 Stat. 644 (2000).
2. U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, FINAL
REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY - PRE-PUBLICATION Copy (2004), available
at http://www.oceancommission.gov (last revised Nov. 20, 2004) [hereinafter OCEAN COMMISSION
REPORT].
3. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (2000)
[hereinafter FCMA].
4. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
5. See Marian Macpherson & Mariam McCall, Judicial Remedies in Fisheries Litigation:
Pros, Cons, and Prestidigitation?, 9 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1 (2003).
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fisheries management and the potential implications of the Ocean Com-
mission Report on the need for frequent judicial review of fishery man-
agement plans. The recent litigation involving the management of New
England groundfish serves as a basis for evaluation of a court's impact
on fishery management. First, this Comment explores the statutes per-
taining to fisheries within the United States' Exclusive Economic Zone,
with particular emphasis on the management regime employed by the
FCMA. Second, this Comment offers an in-depth analysis of the case
Conservation Law Foundation v. Evans6 and its substantial impact on
the New England groundfish industry. Third, within the context of
recent legal challenges to existing statutory structures, this Comment
examines current issues in federal fisheries management and forthcom-
ing changes to the management structure following the release of the
Ocean Commission Report and legislation currently pending in
Congress.
II. HISTORY OF DOMESTIC REGULATION
The 1970s marked a decade of significant international and domes-
tic debate regarding fisheries management. In 1973, Congress passed
the Eastland Resolution, designed to provide "all support necessary" to
strengthen the domestic fishing industry.7 In the mid-1970s, member
states of the United Nations convened for the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).8 The conference prompted
debate among nations as to the distance over which a coastal state could
restrict and exercise jurisdiction over foreign fishing. 9
On the domestic front, new legislative proposals geared toward
reserving rich fishing grounds for American fishing vessels eventually
resulted in the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976.
The FCMA was enacted with two principal objectives: (1) to
exclude foreign fishermen from America's coastal waters and, in turn,
promote the development of American fishing fleets;10 and (2) to pre-
6. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001) (summary judgment
proceeding); Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 195 F. Supp. 2d 186 (D.D.C. 2002) (remedial
measure proceeding); Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 211 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002)
(motions for reconsideration granted, settlement agreement among certain parties implemented).
7. For a discussion of the Eastland Resolution, see, e.g., THE H. JOHN HEINZ III CENT. FOR
Sci., ECON. & THE ENV'T, FISHING GROUNDS: DEFINING A NEW ERA FOR AMERICAN FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT 26 (2000) [hereinafter FISHING GROUNDS].
8. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
9. Articles 56 and 57 of UNCLOS provide coastal states with jurisdiction over fisheries
resources up to 200 nautical miles from shore.
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (2000).
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vent fishery depletion in America's coastal waters.' Although fisher-
men have historically been resistant to any regulation, the benefits
afforded to domestic fishermen under the FCMA reduced opposition to a
federal management regime. In a compromise in 1976, the fishing
industry consented to a federal fisheries management system in
exchange for federal loan guarantees and subsidies and the exclusion of
most, if not all, foreign vessels.' 2 Like the Law of the Sea Convention,
the FCMA is based on the notion that "surplus" is available to foreign
fishing.
The congressional drafters of the FCMA viewed the legislation as a
great step forward for both the American fishing industry and for con-
servation purposes. Senator Warren Magnuson, a lead sponsor of the
Act (and after whom the Act would eventually be named), declared that
"the tools for truly effective management are there."' 3  Senator
Magnuson argued that successful federal management was necessary as
"time was running out on many vital stocks."' 4
In the twenty-nine years following the enactment of the FCMA,
efforts to achieve the first goal have been extremely successful. By
1989, foreign fishing vessels were entirely displaced by U.S.-flagged
vessels, while the quantity of fish extracted from the sea remained con-
stant.' 5 Today, foreign fishing vessels are excluded from fishing within
200 miles of the coast without permission. 6 The late twentieth century
saw the rise of American fishing fleets, benefited by governmental sub-
sidies for the construction of new, technologically sophisticated ves-
sels.' 7 These plans included the Capital Construction Fund, 8 the
Fishing Vessel Obligation Guarantee Program (providing loans to
finance up to 87.5% of the cost of a vessel), 19 and the Fisheries Finance
Program (providing long-term low interest loans to fishermen for the
11. Id. § 1801(b)(3).
12. See Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996 Sustainable
Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799 (1997).
13. See Warren G. Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: First
Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427, 427 (1977).
14. Id. at 439.
15. Harry N. Scheiber, Ocean Governance and the Marine Fisheries Crisis: Two Decades of
Innovation - and Frustration, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 119, 127 (2001); see also David Fluharty,
Magnuson Fishery Management and Conservation Act Reauthorization and Fishery Management
Needs in the North Pacific Region, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 301, 305 (1996).
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (2000).
17. FISHING GROUNDS, supra note 7, at 27.
18. For a description of the Capital Construction Fund, see NOAA Fisheries, Capital
Construction Fund, at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ocs/financialservices/ccf.htm (last updated Jan.
20, 2005).
19. FISHING GROUNDS, supra note 7, at 27.
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construction of new vessels).2 0
In contrast, efforts to achieve the second FCMA goal have been a
catastrophic failure. The emergence, with subsidies, of a larger and
more sophisticated American fishing fleet, while serving to exploit this
nation's rich fishing grounds, also had the effect of rapidly overfishing
the resources.21 The original FCMA did not require fishery managers to
maintain fishery stocks at a level that allows for taking of the maximum
sustainable yield.22 Moreover, the FCMA defined the optimum yield as
"the amount of fish which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the
Nation, particularly with respect to food production and recreational
opportunities. 23 The notion of "greatest overall benefit to the Nation"
has been regarded as allowing great discretion to managers in determin-
ing what quantity of fish may be considered "optimum. '"24 With the
FCMA offering two objectives in opposition to one another - develop-
ment of domestic fishing fleets and conservation of living marine
resources - it should come as no surprise that economic exploitation
largely prevailed over resource conservation.
Even when attempts were made at regulation in the early years of
the FMCA, economic incentives to violate regulations prevailed. One
study suggests that in 1987, a typical frequent violator fishing on
George's Bank would gross nearly a quarter of a million dollars in extra
revenue from illegal fishing.25
III. FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCILS UNDER THE FCMA
When Congress enacted the FCMA, it created a governance struc-
ture composed of eight Regional Fishery Management Councils. 26 The
statute states that council members must be knowledgeable or exper-
ienced with regard to the conservation and management, or the recrea-
tional or commercial harvest, of the fishery resources within their
respective geographic areas of responsibility.27 Members are selected
20. For a description of the Fisheries Finance Program, see NOAA Fisheries, Fisheries
Finance Program, at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ocs/financial-services/ffp.htm (last updated Jan.
20, 2005).
21. See, e.g., FISHING GROUNDS, supra note 7, at 27.
22. W.T. Burke, U.S. Fishery Management and the New Law of the Sea, 76 AM. J. INT'L L.
24, 26 (1982).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(28) (2000).
24. Burke, supra note 22, at 28.
25. Jon G. Sutinen et al., Measuring and Explaining Noncompliance in Federally Managed
Fisheries, 21 OCEAN Dcv. & INT'L L. 335, 346-47 (1990).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a) (2000). The Eight regions governed by the councils are New
England, the Mid-Atlantic, the South Atlantic, the Caribbean, the Gulf, the Pacific, the North
Pacific, and the Western Pacific.
27. Id. § 1852(b)(2)(A).
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by the Secretary of Commerce from lists of nominees submitted by the
Governor of each constituent state.28 In order for a new council member
to be approved, the Secretary must consult with representatives of com-
mercial and recreational fishing interests.2 9  Non-voting members of
management councils include the area director of the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service,3° the commander of the United States Coast Guard
for the area concerned,3 t the executive director of the Marine Fisheries
Commission for the region, 32 and a representative from the Department
of State.33
The primary function of the regional councils is to develop fishery
management plans for each major fishery under its control.34 These
management plans serve as recommendations to the Secretary of Com-
merce for allocation of fisheries resources. All management plans must
be consistent with ten prevailing national standards. Once a council
28. Id. § 1852(b)(2)(C).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1852(c)(1)(A).
31. Id. § 1852(c)(1)(B).
32. Id. § 1852(c)(1)(C).
33. Id. § 1852(c)(1)(D).
34. Id. § 1852(h)(1).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a). The ten standards are as follows:
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while
achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the
United States fishing industry.
(2) Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scientific
information available.
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit
throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit
or in close coordination.
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between
residents of different States. If it becomes necessary to allocate or assign
fishing privileges among various United States fishermen, such allocation shall
be (A) fair and equitable to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to
promote conservation; and (C) carried out in such manner that no particular
individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of such
privileges.
(5) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, consider
efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that no such measure
shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose.
(6) Conservation and management measures shall take into account and allow for
variations among, and contingencies in, fisheries, fishery resources, and
catches.
(7) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize
costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.
(8) Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the
conservation requirements of this chapter (including the prevention of
overfishing and rebuilding of overfished stocks), take into account the
importance of fishery resources to fishing communities in order to (A) provide
2004]
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adopts a fishing plan, it submits the plan to the National Marine Fisher-
ies Service (NMFS). NMFS has the authority to review and adopt or
reject the councils' management plans.36
Management councils also play a significant role in managing over-
capitalized stocks. The FCMA defines overfishing as "a rate or level of
fishing mortality that jeopardizes the capacity of a fishery to produce the
maximum sustainable yield on a continuing basis. ' 37 The council must
determine when a fishery is overfished and include measures in a man-
agement plan to rebuild any overfished fishery.38 The Secretary then
uses this standard to identify fisheries that are overfished or approaching
this condition.39 If the Secretary determines a fishery to be overfished,
he is required to present this determination to the councils and force the
councils to adopt management plans designed to rebuild a depleted
fishery.4 o
IV. CHALLENGES WITH THE STRUCTURE OF COUNCILS
One estimate suggests that shortly after the FCMA was enacted,
seventy-nine percent of voting members of fishery management councils
represented the fishing industry. 41 Even today, because most federal
managers are non-voting members of the councils, the decision-making
authority is largely left in the hands of those with an economic interest
in the fishery. Given that the language of the FCMA calls for members
of management councils to be "qualified individuals," commercial and
recreational fishing interests prevail in the management structure.42
for the sustained participation of such communities, and (B) to the extent
practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities.
(9) Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A)
minimize bycatch and (B) to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize
the mortality of such bycatch.
(10) Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable,
promote the safety of human life at sea.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (2000).
37. Id. § 1802(29).
38. Id. § 1853(a)(10).
39. Id. § 1854(e)(1).
40. Id. § 1854(e)(2).
41. Giulio Pontecorvo, Fishery Management and the General Welfare: Implications of the
New Structure, 52 WASH. L. REv. 641, 652 (1977).
42. Id. at 653. The composition of fishery management councils has been a topic of
considerable academic, political, and industry-wide debate as the FCMA undergoes
reauthorization. See JOSH EAGLE ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY
MANAGEMENT COUNCILS (2003), available at http://www.fisheries.stanford.edu/Stanford-
CouncilReport.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2005); PEw OCEANS COMM'N, AMERICA'S LIVING
OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR SEA CHANGE (2003), available at http://www.pewoceans.org/
oceans/oceansreport.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2005); Senator Ted Stevens, Address at the
Conference on Fisheries Management in the United States (Nov. 13, 2003), in MANAGING OUR
[Vol. 59:83
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Commercial fishermen and state representatives account for a
majority of the votes on councils. In accordance with the priorities of
fishermen, state officials are largely concerned with economic consider-
ations, as deriving income from the fishing industry and minimizing
unemployment is of great importance to a state's political leaders.43 As
such, the regime under the FCMA grants management plan authority to
those individuals and groups with a significant economic interest in the
very fishery they regulate. Insofar as councils are directed to arrive at
management decisions through the best available science, the lack of
scientists and academics as participating members of management coun-
cils should be a cause for alarm.' While the FCMA calls for each man-
agement council to commission a scientific committee, this committee
has no voting power, its decisions are merely advisory in nature, and
there is no apparent requirement for the committee to convene.45
Foreseeing the management failures under the FCMA from an eco-
nomic standpoint, Professor Giulio Pontecorvo stated in 1977 that "no
regional or local body, no matter how constructed or how constituted, is
likely to move effectively and efficiently to enhance the general wel-
fare."46  Drawing upon the reasoning of Adam Smith,47 Professor
Pontecorvo predicted that councils composed of individuals advocating
local interests will act in their own interest.48 Accordingly, the tendency
was for management councils to yield to shortsighted management goals
desired by the industry at the expense of long-term conservation. 4
9
Therefore, not only did fishermen gain valuable subsidies through the
NATION'S FISHERIES: PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 11, 12 (David Witherell ed., 2004) (A "terrible policy
objective is the attempt to federalize regional councils to reduce [their] relevance to that of
subcommittee status .... The mechanism we have now works!").
43. Pontecorvo, supra note 41, at 651.
44. Dayton L. Alverson, The Role of Conservation and Fishery Science Under the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 723, 728 (1977).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(g)(4) (2000).
46. Pontecorvo, supra note 41, at 654.
47. Adam Smith wrote:
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion,
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance
to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which
either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But
though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling
together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render
them necessary.
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (Cannan ed., 1937).
48. Pontecorvo, supra note 41, at 654.
49. Scheiber, supra note 15, at 128. Professor Scheiber argues that the Reagan and Bush I
administrations elected not to interfere with regional councils or force them to ensure that
management plans achieved conservation objectives.
2004]
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passage of the FCMA, but they also managed to gain control of the
legislative apparatus under the new program.5 °
The original version of the FCMA was largely silent on what action
NMFS was to take to prevent overfishing. Conservation groups asserted
that throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, NMFS largely served as a
rubber stamp for council recommendations.5
While Congress established a system in the FCMA designed to
avoid overfishing and to remedy any depleted fishery, the conservation
language of the statute is undermined by the mandate to make all deci-
sions within the context of economics.52 The FCMA clearly states that
overfishing is to be balanced against achieving the optimum yield from
each fishery.53 With governmental actions in the 1970s and 1980s
aimed toward encouraging the development of domestic fishing fleets,
there should have been little doubt that the exploitation and conservation
language of the statute would eventually be at loggerheads. Indeed,
commercial catches in the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by U.S.
fishermen quadrupled from 737,000 metric tons in 1976 to 2,953,000
metric tons in 1988. 54
V. A SHIFT TOWARD CONSERVATION
The decline of fish populations and the lack of conservation mea-
sures employed by the Councils led to a National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (NOAA) "Blue Ribbon" panel in the mid-
1980s. The panel's recommendation called for the separation of the
decision-making responsibility regarding conservation and allocation in
fisheries management.56 For instance, conservation decisions such as
stock assessments, health of fish populations, and available catch are
made without regard or consideration to how the available catch will be
allocated among fishermen. Adoption of such an approach, viewing bio-
logical data outside the context of socioeconomic factors, presented a
framework for greater ecological emphasis in management.57 By the
late 1980s, the notion of excluding individuals from fishing - consid-
50. Hsu & Wilen, supra note 12.
51. Peter Shelley et al., The New England Fisheries Crisis: What Have We Learned?, 9 TUL.
ENvn. L.J. 221 (1996).
52. This, however, is a complex question. The purpose of long-term sustainability -
maximum sustainable yield - is both environmental and economic. The difficult issue, though,
is long-term sustainability versus short-term economic gain.
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2000).
54. Morton M. Miller et al., Impressions of Ocean Fisheries Management Under the
Magnuson Act, 21 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 263, 264 (1990).
55. FISHING GROUNDS, supra note 7, at 28.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 29.
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ered a radical idea earlier in the decade - became an accepted require-
ment in many fisheries.58 With this, councils and states began adopting
limited entry programs to curb the excessive number of vessels engaged
in marine fishing. 59
a. Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996
Not only was there growing sentiment among members of Con-
gress that the council system disregarded conservation, beginning in the
early 1990s, non-profit environmental groups began challenging NMFS'
approval of council management plans.60 In an effort to address man-
agement issues including conservation, the FCMA went through Con-
gressional reauthorization in 1996. The Sustainable Fisheries Act
(SFA), which amended the FCMA, placed a greater emphasis on conser-
vation by revising the statute to require measures such as protecting
essential fish habitat,6 ' rebuilding overfished fisheries,62 and reducing
bycatch.63
Recognizing the potential for conflicts of interest associated with
the council system, Congress altered the voting procedures through an
entirely new section in the SFA.64 The SFA requires council members
to abstain from voting on decisions that would have a "significant and
predictable effect on [their] financial interests. ' '65 To ensure compliance
with the new voting procedures, the Secretary is required to select an
official to attend Council meetings and determine if a conflict of interest
exists. 66 While this system is designed to prevent individuals from vot-
ing on management plans in which they have a direct financial interest,
the system does not take any steps to change the composition of the
management councils. On most councils, traditional advocates of long-
term sustainability of fish populations are still without a vote. As a
result, lawsuits in the federal courts have grown in number as environ-
mental groups seek a forum in which to promote enforcement of the
statutory conservation mandates.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Conservation Law Found. v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding that NMFS
failed to adhere to congressional mandates with respect to New England cod, haddock, and
yellowtail flounder).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(10) (2000).
62. Id. § 1802(29).
63. Id. § 1802(2).
64. Id. § 18520).
65. Id. § 1852(j)(7)(A).
66. Id. § 1852(j)(1)(B).
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b. Conservation Law Foundation v. Evans
As of January 2002, NOAA and NMFS were named defendants in
more than 110 pending fisheries lawsuits.67 A recent, and perhaps the
most compelling, lawsuit to enter federal court revolves around New
England groundfish.68 Commenced in the District Court for the District
of Columbia by four environmental groups, the lawsuit sought to pre-
vent NMFS from approving a management plan promulgated by the
New England Fishery Management Council.
Following the passage of the SFA, the New England Council
adopted Fisheries Management Plan Amendment 9, designed to revise
the annual groundfish fishing mortality rates of twelve species in order
to bring the council into compliance with the SFA.69 Amendment 9
took effect on November 15, 1999. On April 24, 2000, NMFS approved
Framework Adjustment 33,7o which implemented fishing mortality rates
from the old Amendment 7, not the new Amendment 9.7 As such, the
fishing target of Framework 33 did not comply with the overfishing and
fishery rebuilding provisions of Amendment 9.72 The four environmen-
tal groups alleged that NMFS violated the SFA and the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).73
NMFS claimed that the council sought to avoid the comprehensive
environmental impact statement required by the National Environmental
Policy Act,74 and therefore, reverted to Amendment 7.75 Moreover,
NMFS further argued that Amendment 9 itself did not comply with the
SFA.76 Although NMFS conceded its measures did not comply with the
SFA, it claimed that by August 2003 it would implement the forthcom-
ing Amendment 13, which purportedly would comply with the SFA.77
In the meantime, NMFS claimed Framework 33 was an adequate system
67. OCEAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 232.
68. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2001) (summary judgment
proceeding); Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 195 F. Supp. 2d 186 (D.D.C. 2002) (remedial
measure proceeding); Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 211 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002)
(motions for reconsideration granted, settlement agreement among certain parties implemented).
69. Conservation Law Found., 209 F. Supp. 2d at 7 n.7. The twelve species are cod,
haddock, yellowtail flounder, American plaice, witch flounder, winter flounder, redfish, white
hake, pollock, windowpane flounder, ocean pout, and Atlantic halibut.
70. Framework adjustments are ways in which councils can add or modify management
measures.
71. Conservation Law Found., 209 F. Supp. 2d at 7-8.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 8.
74. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4345 (1994).
75. Conservation Law Found., 209 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 9-10.
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for conservation of overfished species.78 On a motion for summary
judgment, the District Court determined that NMFS' refusal to imple-
ment Amendment 9 was arbitrary and capricious, thus violating the SFA
and the APA.79
Following the summary judgment proceeding, the District Court for
the District of Columbia conducted a remedial phase of the case.80 Rec-
ognizing the significance of judicial proceedings involving groundfish
allocation, many seafood processing groups, states, cities, and fishing
alliances intervened in the remedial proceedings.8" Due to the substan-
tive complexities of the case and the regional interest in the outcome, on
February 15, 2002, the court urged mediation.82 Further adding to the
judicial challenges in this case was the fact that the fishing season com-
menced on May 1, 2002.83 Thus, the primary reason for urging media-
tion (while simultaneously conducting formal briefings before the court)
was to avoid a situation in which the court had to develop a remedy
under intense time pressures.84
On the mediation track, more than forty people from all interested
parties engaged in five fourteen-hour sessions attempting to reach a res-
olution.8 5 Ultimately, many of the parties reached a proposed settle-
ment, which was filed on April 16, 2002, two weeks prior to the opening
of the 2002 fishing season.86 The court elected to use this agreement as
78. Id. at 9.
79. Id. at 10.
80. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 195 F. Supp. 2d 186 (D.D.C. 2002).
81. Id. at 188. The intervening parties were Northeast Seafood Coalition, Associated
Fisheries of Maine, the Cities of Portland, Maine and New Bedford, Massachusetts, the Trawlers
Survival Fund, the State of Maine, the State of New Hampshire, the State of Rhode Island, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and Paul Parker, Craig A. Pendleton, Northwest Atlantic
Marine Alliance, Stonington Fisheries Alliance, Saco Bay Alliance, and Cape Cod Commercial
Hook Fishermen's Association.
82. Id. at 188-89.
83. Id. at 189.
84. Id. As noted infra, this is precisely the type of situation that courts are not well prepared
to manage and, thus, such determinations should be left to the federal agency with the relevant
technical and scientific expertise.
85. Id.
86. Id. The settlement agreement is available at http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/pressrelease/
settleagree.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2005). The following parties submitted to the Settlement
Agreement: Plaintiff Conservation Law Foundation, Defendants Donald L. Evans, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Marine Fisheries Service, the State of
Maine, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the State of New Hampshire, the State of Rhode
Island, the Association Fisheries of Maine, Inc., the City of Portland, Maine, the City of New
Bedford, Massachusetts, the Trawlers Survival Fund, and Paul Parker, Craig A. Pendleton,
Northwest Atlantic Marine Alliance, Inc., Stonington Fisheries Alliance, Saco Bay Alliance, and
Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fisherman's Association, Inc. Objections to the Settlement
Agreement were filed by Plaintiffs National Audubon Society, Natural Resources Defense
Council, and The Ocean Conservancy, and Intervenor Northeast Seafood Coalition.
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a baseline remedy and made its own substantive changes due to the
objections of the non-settling parties.87
The principal area of disagreement between the settling parties and
the non-settling parties dealt with the implementation of a total allowa-
ble catch (TAC) system.88 The non-settling plaintiffs advocated a hard-
TAC system such as a firm catch limit to supplement indirect manage-
ment measures, including controlling numbers of boats, nets, net size, or
fishing time, utilized by NMFS to prevent overfishing.89 Defendants,
intervenors, and plaintiff Conservation Law Foundation all strongly
opposed such a system.9" While hard-TAC systems aim to cap fish
landings at a fixed limit, such systems require sound scientific informa-
tion to determine the population projections that form the basis for catch
limits information that is not available for all fisheries. Furthermore,
hard-TAC systems can lead to so-called "race to fish," whereby fishing
effort is concentrated at the beginning of the season, a time when sea
conditions are more dangerous and when fish spawning is at or near its
peak.
Determining an appropriate remedy to the problems facing New
England groundfish fishing was termed by the court to be "one of the
hardest tasks this Court has ever undertaken."9 1 The complexity stems
from the social, economic, and political interests in fishing. Moreover,
the court indicated it lacked the "rigorous, focused, scientific research,
data, and understanding which are absolutely necessary to develop long-
term strategies for rebuilding stocks .... "" The situation was further
complicated when amid this litigation, and six weeks prior to the open-
ing of the 2002 fishing season, the government filed the most recent best
available scientific information for the multispecies New England
groundfish complex.93 Frustrated with the changes in the scientific land-
scape, the court acknowledged in its opinion the difficulty of having to
fashion a remedy with changing scientific information.94
87. Conservation Law Found., 195 F. Supp. at 192.
88. Under a total allowable catch system, fishing for a species is prohibited once a pre-set
quantity of fish of that particular species has been caught.
89. Conservation Law Found., 195 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
90. Id. at 193-94.
91. Id. at 190.
92. Id.
93. WORKING GROUP ON RE-EVALUATION OF BIOLOGICAL REFERENCE FOR NEW ENGLAND
GROUNDFISH, NORTHEAST FISHERIES SCIENCE CENTER REF. Doc. 02-04, FINAL REPORT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON RE-EVALUATION OF BIOLOGICAL REFERENCE POINTS FOR NEW ENGLAND
GROUNDFISH (2002), available at http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/publications/crd/crd0204 (last
visited Jan. 20, 2005).
94. Conservation Law Found., 195 F. Supp. 2d at 190-91. The court stated:
Much of the blame for this situation can be laid at the feet of NMFS. It frequently
misses its own deadlines for complying with statutory mandates, it drags its feet
[Vol. 59:83
THE EVOLVING ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS
Prior to outlining a substantive remedy, the court first evaluated the
applicability of a hard-TAC system. Citing four principal reasons, the
court rejected the opportunity to establish such a system. First, the sci-
entific data necessary to successfully implement a hard-TAC system did
not exist at the time.95 The court explained that for a hard-TAC to be
successful, resource managers must have access to not only landing data,
but also real-time catch data to determine the quantity of bycatch mortal-
ity - data that was not available for the New England groundfish fish-
eries.96 Furthermore, no consensus existed as to the best scientific
information available regarding biological reference points for catch
limits.9 7 Without such information, a hard-TAC system would run
counter to National Standard Two,98 which mandates fisheries be man-
aged "'based upon the best scientific information available.' ,
The second reason the court rejected a hard-TAC system was that
such a system might lead to increased bycatch.'t ° This reasoning sug-
gests that if a hard-TAC system was in place, fishermen would continue
fishing for the remaining available stocks, which, in turn, would result in
discarding accidental catch of the prohibited species, thereby increasing
bycatch and fish mortality. 101
The court's third reason for rejecting a hard-TAC system was that
such a system could have an adverse impact on the safety of fishermen.
A management regime that serves to threaten fishermen's safety runs
counter to National Standard Ten, which requires promotion of safety at
sea. 12 The court determined that a hard-TAC system "'inevitably leads
to a race to fish whereby individual fishing vessels are compelled to
catch as much of the quota possible before fishing is shut down.' 103
completing vitally significant marine research, and it is often the case that the
federal courts must be called upon to force it to live up to its statutory obligations.
The very fact that this Court is in the unenviable position of having to decide such
an important issue on the eve of the May 1 deadline reflects the failure of NMFS to
comply with the statute in a timely fashion.
Id. at 191 n.6.
95. Id. at 194.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (2000).
99. Conservation Law Found., 195 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2)
(2000)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 16 U.S.C. § 185 1(a)(10) (2000). Hard-TAC systems are believed to encourage fishermen
to fish in dangerous conditions in order to capture as much of the allowable catch as possible
before the total catch limit is reached.
103. Conservation Law Found., 195 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (quoting Conservation Law
Foundation's Reply to Responses of National Audubon Society et al. and Northeast Seafood
Coalition to the Proposed Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Order at 5, Conservation Law
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The fourth reason the court cited for rejecting a hard-TAC system
was a potential adverse effect on the biological health of the fish stocks.
A "race to fish" beginning on the first of May would serve to concen-
trate fishing effort at a peak spawning period for New England
groundfish. "
After considering the Settlement Agreement Among Certain Par-
ties, the court modified substantive portions of the agreement to facili-
tate what, in its mind, would achieve the intended conservation
mandates of the FCMA. Although the judicial remedy was the result of
careful deliberation, all of the settling parties submitted motions for
reconsideration of the remedial action.1 °5 This fact suggests that judicial
tampering with consensus agreements among the vast majority of inter-
ested parties, particularly in the context of complex scientific disputes,
may run counter to the very outcome the court sought to achieve.
Less than one month after issuing its Remedial Order, the court
granted all motions for reconsideration, stating that "the important
changes made by the Court in the complex and carefully crafted Settle-
ment Agreement Among Certain Parties would produce unintended con-
sequences."'' 0 6 The court outlined three potential unintended negative
consequences stemming from the Remedial Order: (1) failing to achieve
desired results and potentially further harming particular vulnerable spe-
cies; (2) unbalancing the Settlement Agreement that was intended by the
parties to be implemented as a whole; and (3) causing grave economic
and social hardship and injustice to individuals, fishing communities,
and states.' As a result, the Settlement Agreement was implemented
according to its terms, and all judicial modifications were stricken. 10 8
Found. v. Evans, 195 F. Supp. 2d 186 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. 00-1 134GK)). For a discussion on the
costs and benefits of fishing quotas, see, e.g., Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons:
Environmental Scholarship and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393
(1999).
104. Conservation Law Found., 195 F. Supp. 2d at 194-95.
105. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 211 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002).
106. Id. at 56-57.
107. Id. at 57.
108. Id. In the months following the implementation of the Settlement Agreement Among
Certain Parties, there were several developments that further complicated the landscape of the
New England groundfish situation. The catalyst for outcry among fishermen and industry
representatives was the revelation that NMFS did not accurately conduct fish stock assessment
surveys, upon which the settlement agreement was based. In September 2002, NMFS revealed
that its nets may have been faulty. See, e.g., David Arnold, Test Said to Show Fish Undercount:
Officials Meeting on Research Results, BosToN GLOBE, Sept. 29, 2002, at B3; John Richardson,
Experts Trolling for Data Run Afoul of Fishermen: "Trawlgate " Only Increases the Distrust of
Fishermen Whose Livelihoods Depend on Solid Groundfish Counts, MAIN SUNDAY TELEGRAM,
Oct. 6, 2002, at 1A. Industry seized on the error, claiming the faulty equipment NMFS deployed
underestimated the groundfish stock size. See JoHN RICHARDSON, Delay Likely for Groundfish
Rules, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Nov. 10, 2002, at lB.
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c. Prevailing Council Issues
The New England groundfish litigation serves as a useful case
study for the evolving landscape of fisheries management. A situation
that began with the New England Fishery Management Council promul-
gating a fishery management plan subsequently approved by NMFS
turned into lengthy and complex federal litigation, which served to illu-
minate many of the prevailing issues in domestic fisheries management.
When Congress passed the FCMA in 1976, the "tools for truly
effective management" 109 advocated by Senator Magnuson involved
granting much of the decision-making authority to "qualified individu-
als" as opposed to governmental agencies. This system of public
involvement and empowering user groups had the objective of providing
for a regime in which all interested parties had a voice and a stake in the
outcome. Although fish stocks in many regions of the United States'
EEZ experienced substantial population declines since the FCMA took
effect, the consensus management regime is not altogether an inappro-
priate system. The problem is not consensus regimes in general; rather,
it is the specific regime employed by the FCMA. A regime of negoti-
ated decisions must involve all interested parties, as equitable consensus
cannot be achieved when a large voting bloc is occupied by one com-
mon interest.'1
The director of the New England Fishery Management Council
argues that "[s]tewardship, accountability, innovation and partnerships
are most likely to develop using the Council process, which provides for
transparency and stakeholder input at all levels of fishery management
plan development."' I Given the recent history of council decisions, and
the associated management plans that consider conservation as a secon-
dary objective, it remains an issue as to whether the Council process is
actually promoting "[s]tewardship, accountability, innovation and part-
nerships." The conceptual goal is laudable; the question, however, is
whether it is achievable under the current system.
Fisheries policy must be structured in a manner that reflects current
As a result of the dispute over science, the court agreed to delay the implementation of new
fishing regulations until May 2004. See Beth Daley, Judge Delays Start of New Fishing Rules,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 2002, at B2. Moreover, the Assistant Administrator for NMFS agreed to
extend the timeline for complete rebuilding of the groundfish fishery from 2009 until 2014. See
Kay Lazar, Fishermen Catch Break on Fed. Restrictions, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 15, 2003, at 2.
109. Magnuson, supra note 13.
110. There is, of course, a tension between the long-term, risk-averse, views of fisheries
management typically held by conservationists, and the short-term, loss-averse views typically
held by industry representatives.
111. NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, HEADING TOWARD RECOVERY:
REBUILDING NEW ENGLAND'S FISHERIES 2 (2002), available at www.nefmc.org/press/nefisheries
Brochure.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
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ecological and economic conditions. When the FCMA took effect in
1976, one principal objective was to advance the domestic fishing fleet
at the expense of foreign fleets. With this objective accomplished, the
management regime must now focus on how best to protect the resource
and advance the ecological health of the stocks and the economic status
of fishermen. One challenge is attempting to modify a nearly thirty-
year-old statute to meet the different management issues of today.
While Congress, through the SFA, attempted to address the collapse of
fish stock populations through modifying conflict of interest provisions
in council voting procedures, it did nothing to alter the fundamental
structure of the councils and the composition of the voting members.
Councils continue to be dominated by members of the commercial
fishing industry, or individuals sympathetic to the economic needs of
fishermen and associated industries. Biologists, conservation groups,
academics, and federal government officials are still relegated largely to
the role of outside observers of the voting process. Even after the SFA,
councils continue to adopt policies that fail to meet congressionally
mandated conservation objectives. This problem is not limited to the
New England council. Two recent examples illustrate the prevailing
problem on a national scale. First, in 1999 summer flounder litigation
arose after NMFS was presented with the Mid-Atlantic Council's quota
decision that had a three percent chance of meeting target mortality
rates.112 NMFS modified that plan to have an eighteen percent chance
of meeting target mortality rates and was subsequently sued by a conser-
vation group." 3 The D.C. Circuit held that NMFS's quota "so com-
pletely 'diverges from any realistic meaning' of the Fishery Act that it
cannot survive scrutiny under Chevron Step Two."'"1
4
A second example of a council adopting policies that do not meet
conservation objectives is the Pacific Fisheries Management Council's
submission of an unsustainable proposed amendment to the Pacific
Coast Groundfish FMP in order to comply with the SFA." t5 When
NMFS approved the plan, three conservation groups collectively sued
and moved for summary judgment on the ground that NMFS violated
the FCMA through its approval of the plan." 6 The District Court for the
112. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
113. Id. at 751.
114. Id. at 755 (quoting GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). See
also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). When
reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute, Chevron requires a two step evaluation: First, is
the statutory language ambiguous? If the answer to the first step is yes, Chevron step two requires
a court to determine whether the agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable. Id. at 842-43.
115. Pac. Marine Conservation Council, Inc. v. Evans, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
116. Id. at 1196.
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Northern District of California engaged in a classic discussion regarding
what deference courts should give to agencies following the guidelines
provided through previous decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. 1 7
NMFS took the position that a court should defer to the expertise of the
Councils and agency approval of council decisions.' 18 The conservation
groups argued that an agency decision is due no deference when the
agency fails to engage in reasoned decision-making." 9 The court here
accepted the conservation groups' argument and held that "[i]f the intent
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress."' 2 ° Perhaps the lasting message from this decision is that
NMFS may not hide behind the purported expertise of council members.
Although the function of the councils is to promulgate management
plans, the ultimate decision-making authority and responsibility remain
with NMFS.
VI. LEGAL CHALLENGES
Instead of direct participation in promulgating and voting on man-
agement plans, those advocating conservation interests are left with two
primary recourses. The first is to appeal to NMFS to reject or modify
management plans. The second is to mount a legal challenge in the
federal courts to enforce the statutory provisions of the FCMA and the
APA. As the statute is currently written, a legal challenge must occur
through the APA, as no citizen suit provision remains in the FCMA."2'
Without input on regional councils, conservation groups are likely
to continue turning to courts for enforcement of their interests. Recent
litigation suggests federal courts are increasingly willing to hear chal-
lenges to fishery management plans.122 A system formerly characterized
117. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
118. Pac. Marine Conservation Council, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1200 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
121. Other environmental statutes already contain such provisions. See, e.g., Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000); Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000).
One commentator suggests that through citizen suit provisions, environmental groups have
assumed some of the fundamental functions of the federal government insofar as such provisions
give power to decide what laws to enforce. See Susan D. Daggett, NGOs as Lawmakers,
Watchdogs, Whistle-blowers, and Private Attorneys General, 13 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 99, 102 (2002). Although representation on regional councils and litigation are not
mutually exclusive, one objective of the former would be to reduce the need to resort to litigation
and promote a better understanding of all sides of the issues if litigation does occur.
122. For a sample of recent fisheries litigation, see, e.g., Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v.
United States, 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 360 F.3d 21
(lst Cir. 2004); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 316 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2003); Campanale &
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by deference to councils is undergoing a judicial modification that grants
greater supervisory powers to NMFS and an increasing role for federal
district courts as overseers of conservation procedures. The Conserva-
tion Law Foundation case is but one example of a court retaining juris-
diction to ensure compliance with congressional mandates. 123 The court
in that case recognized the position advocated by many conservation
groups when it stated, "NMFS' history demonstrates the necessity of
judicial monitoring .. ."2' As conservation groups have no adequate
legal remedy at law to prevent overfishing, the injunction is a tool one
would expect to be employed in fisheries litigation. 12 1
Before environmental groups hail litigation as the best solution to
disputes over allocation, conservation, and limited entry, a series of
questions must be addressed to adequately assess the potential impact of
taking fishing disputes to the courtroom. These issues regarding the
appropriate role of courts are relevant to fisheries management not only
in the United States, but also in other countries and at the international
level. 126
First, is a court the appropriate forum for conservation groups to
address their issues? Judges may lack the expertise and specialized
knowledge that the FCMA requires of decision makers. Thus, by plac-
ing complex fisheries issues in the hands of the judiciary, the most con-
troversial and complex issues are no longer ultimately decided by the
most knowledgeable individuals. While courts are insulated from indus-
try pressures in reaching decisions, judges typically are not equipped
with the scientific expertise or specialization required to assess intricate
Sons, Inc. v. Evans, 311 F.3d 109 (1st Cir. 2002); Wards Cove Packing Corp. v. Nat'l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 307 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2002); Prowler P'ship v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
242 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2000); Hawaii Longline Ass'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 288 F.
Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2003); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 280 F. Supp. 2d
1007 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 254 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Greenpeace v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 237 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (W.D. Wash. 2002); Blue
Water Fisherman's Ass'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 226 F. Supp. 2d 330 (D. Mass. 2002);
Ctr. for Marine Conservation v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., CV No. 99-00152 DAE, 2001 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 25453 (D. Haw. Mar. 30, 2001); Greenpeace v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. C98-
492Z, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5338 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 2000); Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's
Ass'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (WD. Wash. 1999); Massachusetts v.
Daley, 10 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Mass. 1998).
123. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 195 F. Supp. 2d 186 (D.D.C. 2002).
124. Id. at 193.
125. For an in-depth discussion of the use of injunctions, see, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss & Douc
RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 58 (2d ed. 1984).
126. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 8, arts. 297-99; United
Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, open for signature Dec. 4, 1995, arts. 27-32, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.164/37, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1542, at 1569 (1995).
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data. 127
Second, do judges want to decide the merits of these complex, tech-
nical issues? Judicial interpretation of intricate and often disputed sci-
ence may not serve the interests of either fishermen or conservation
groups.
Third, does litigation serve to decrease public participation in fish-
eries management? Perhaps by removing some of the decision-making
process from the council system, the balance of power in fisheries man-
agement will shift to those with access to lawyers. Some commentators
suggest that fisheries litigation moves many management decisions
away from the public domain and into the courts.' 28  As courts are
increasingly called upon to enforce conservation requirements, "we are
seeing a movement away from participatory management toward a more
command and control kind of decision-making process."'
129
At this point, it is worth returning to the New England groundfish
litigation to consider the fate of the case following the court's imple-
mentation of the Settlement Agreement Among Certain Parties. Follow-
ing the court's order to draft a new fisheries management plan that
complies with the conservation provisions of the FCMA, the New
England Fishery Management Council began drafting Amendment 13.
On December 18, 2003, the New England Fishery Management Council
(NEFMC) submitted Amendment 13 to the Secretary of Commerce for
review. Pursuant to section 1854(a)(1) of the FCMA, 130 the Secretary
published notice of Amendment 13 in the Federal Register on December
29, 2003.13 ' Following the sixty-day comment period, the Secretary
127. The Law of the Sea Convention, in connection with compulsory arbitration in
adjudication of fisheries disputes, offers in Annex VIII, a special procedure for arbitrating
fisheries disputes designed to provide more expertise. Annex VIII provides:
[A]ny party to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the articles
of this Convention relating to (1) fisheries, (2) protection and preservation of the
marine environment, (3) marine scientific research, or (4) navigation, including
pollution from vessels and by dumping, may submit the dispute to the special
arbitral procedure provided for in this Annex by written notification addressed to the
other party or parties to the dispute. The notification shall be accompanied by a
statement of the claim and the grounds on which it is based.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 8, at Annex VIII, art. 1. Annex
VIII further provides that each party to the dispute shall appoint two members to the arbitral
tribunal and the parties shall agree to the appointment of the President of the tribunal. Id. at
Annex VIII, arts. 3(b), 3(c), 3(d). This system of dispute resolution thus allows for resolution by
experts in the technical field, rather than by a court of general jurisdiction.
128. Bonnie McCay & Susan Han, More Than Meets the Eye: The Transaction Costs of
Litigation, 7 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 13, 14 (2001).
129. Id.
130. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(1) (2000).
131. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act Provisions, 68 Fed. Reg.
74,939 (Dec. 29, 2003).
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partially approved Amendment 13. Finally, on April 27, 2004, four days
before the Conservation Law Foundation court's deadline for a new
management plan, the Secretary published the final version of Amend-
ment 13 in the Federal Register. 32
Although Amendment 13 arose out of a settlement agreement
between conservation groups, the fishing industry, and the federal man-
agers, the new plan is now the foundation for even more litigation. New
litigation was commenced in both the District Court for the District of
Columbia 133 and the District Court for the District of Maine.'34 These
cases were brought both by the fishing industry (challenging the reduc-
tion in available days at sea for fishing) and by conservation groups
(alleging that Amendment 13 still fails to comply with the overfishing
requirements of the FCMA). Even after the highly publicized Settle-
ment Agreement, the passion for both the fishing livelihood and the
environmentally sound management of marine resources is strong
enough to land this controversy back in court. It is becoming ever more
apparent that the only way to avoid placing disputes over marine
resources in the hands of the federal judiciary is to reform the manage-
ment system that creates the rules. The current management regime has
evolved to the point where federal courts are called upon to resolve dis-
putes that are better dealt with by those with scientific and industry
expertise. In this respect, implementation of the recommendations by
the Ocean Commission will create a more comprehensive system of
management plan review before approval by the Secretary of Com-
merce, rather than a system requiring a dedication of substantial judicial
resources after the Secretary's approval.
These considerations have led to the suggestion that arbitrators and
adjudicators should serve as "conservators of last resort."' 35 There is
little question that courts do have a significant role to play in administra-
tive law generally. To the extent that this role is to ensure not only that
administrative agencies do not exceed their powers, but also carry out
their statutory duties, the courts act as a necessary safeguard. The ques-
tion here, however, is one of appropriate balance and the minimization
132. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act Provisions, 69 Fed. Reg.
22,906 (Apr. 27, 2004).
133. First Amended Complaint, Oceana, Inc. v. Evans (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 1:04-cv-0081 I-
ESH). Two other cases were consolidated with the Oceana case: Conservation Law Foundation,
Inc. v. Evans (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 1:04-cv-00839-ESH) and Trawlers Survival Fund v. Evans
(D.D.C. 2004) (No. l:04-cv-00862-ESH).
134. Complaint, Assoc. Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Evans, No. 04-CV-108-P-S (D. Me. May
27, 2004).
135. Bernard H. Oxman, Complementary Agreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 277, 309 (2001).
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of situations in which courts are confronted with the need to take over
management themselves.
VII. MOVING FORWARD
Over the course of the next year, fisheries policy is likely to
undergo substantial change. Under the Oceans Act, the President of the
United States had ninety days from the release of the Ocean Commis-
sion Report to formulate a course of action, and the Bush Administration
has in fact released its response. 36 Additionally, members of both the
House of Representatives and the Senate are already working toward the
passage of new legislation. Three new bills relating to ocean govern-
ance are currently pending on the floors of Congress. 137 Through vari-
ous legislative mechanisms, these bills seek to reform fishery
management councils by strengthening conflict of interest provisions, to
require that science play a larger role in fisheries management decisions,
and to implement recommendations of the Ocean Commission.
Broader participation in the decision-making processes of regional
councils is the first step towards reducing the pressures on Article LII
courts to intervene in the management regime. Without a voice - or,
more importantly, a vote - on many of the councils, the efforts put
forth by advocates of long-term fisheries sustainability are frequently
marginalized. With short-term economic interests driving the manage-
ment decisions, courts are increasingly called upon to enforce the con-
servation mandates contained in the FCMA. Recognizing this problem,
the Ocean Commission urged the reform of the council member selec-
tion process. The Commission suggested that "Congress should amend
the [FCMA] to require governors to submit a broad slate of candidates
for each vacancy of an appointed Regional Fishery Management Coun-
cil seat. The slate should include at least two representatives each from
the commercial fishing industry, the recreational fishing section, and the
general public."' 38 With wider representation on councils, the delicate
balance between long-term and short-term interests will be addressed in
a more effective manner. The process of negotiation, as advocated in
the original version of the FCMA, will produce more effective results,
provided that representatives of all interested groups are equal at the
negotiation table.
136. U.S. Ocean Action Plan: The Bush Administration's Response to the U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy, available at http://ocean.ceq.gov/actionplan.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
137. See Fishery Conservation and Management Amendments Act of 2004, S. 2066, 108th
Cong. (2004); National Ocean Policy and Leadership Act, S. 2647, 108th Cong. (2004); Oceans
Conservation, Education, and National Strategy for the 21st Century Act, H.R. 4900, 108th Cong.
(2004).
138. OCEAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 243.
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The second significant improvement to the current system of fisher-
ies management contained in the reform proposals involves greater
attention to scientific data and a separation of biological stock assess-
ments and fisheries catch limits. An effective management structure
requires a trust in sound science and the absence of a scientific agenda.
As the New England groundfish stock assessments illustrated, poor sci-
ence only complicates the management difficulties.' 39 To address this
issue, the Ocean Commission suggested that "[elach Regional Fishery
Management Council ... should set harvest limits at or below the allow-
able biological catch determined by its Scientific and Statistical Com-
mittee. The [Councils] should begin immediately to follow this practice,
which should be codified by Congress in amendments to the
[FCMA] .' ' 140 Furthermore,
[o]nce allowable biological catch is determined, whether by the Sci-
entific and Statistical Committee or the National Marine Fisheries
Service ... Regional Science Director, the [Council] should propose
a fishery management plan in time for adequate review and approval
by NMFS. If the plan is not in place in a timely fashion, NMFS
should suspend all fishing on that stock until it is able to review the
adequacy of the management plan.
14
Effective reform of the fisheries management process requires
innovate thought and interdisciplinary decision-making from those in
the policy arena. However, even the most effective concepts will fail to
achieve desired results without a reduction in fishing effort. With too
many technologically sophisticated boats and too few fish, the industry
can undermine any management scheme that does not call for a reduc-
tion in days at sea or catch. To this end, the Ocean Commission recom-
mends removing all economic incentives for fishermen to better equip
their existing boats or construction of new vessels. "Congress should
repeal all programs that encourage overcapitalization of fishing fleets,
including the Fisheries Finance Program (formerly the Fishing Vessel
Obligation Guarantee Program) and those sections of the Capital Con-
struction Fund that apply to fisheries. [NOAA] should take appropriate
steps to permanently reduce fishing capacity to sustainable levels."' 42
Although these economic incentives were necessary to develop the
American fishing fleet in the 1970s and early 1980s, today's fisheries
139. See, e.g., Gareth Cook & Beth Daley, Mistrust Between Scientists, Fishermen Mars Key
Mission, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 27, 2003, at Al (NOAA's flawed data collection has been referred
to as "Trawlgate" on the docks).
140. OCEAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 235.
141. Id. at 236.
142. Id. at 248.
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landscape clearly requires a reduction in fishing effort. 14
Implementation of the recommendations proffered in the Ocean
Commission Report will serve as an effective beginning in realigning
the scope of federal fisheries management. While the federal courts
have served to enforce the conservation mandates of the FCMA, there is
little doubt that the goals federal management structure developed in
1976 and subsequently amended in 1996 did not include turning to
courts as de facto fisheries managers. As the Conservation Law Foun-
dation case demonstrates, complex biological and policy problems that
involve an industry with a significant social and economic history do not
lend to simple solutions. While the Conservation Law Foundation court
considered these factors in a laudable manner, the ultimate decisions in
fisheries management need to be resolved by members of regional coun-
cils and the National Marine Fisheries Service, not the federal courts.
With increased public representation on the regional councils, a reduc-
tion in fishing effort, and the separation of science and allocation, the
federal management structure has the potential to guide America's fish-
eries toward greater short-term and long-term prosperity.
DAVID B. JOYCE*
143. Vessel and fishing permit buyback programs have been instituted for both the Atlantic
and Pacific groundfish fleets. See Northeast Multispecies Fishery, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,668 (Apr. 3,
2001) (Atlantic); Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions, 68 Fed. Reg. 42,613 (July 18, 2003)
(Pacific). A study by the NOAA found that 46.2% of fishermen in the New England groundfish
fishery are similarly interested in a buyback program and 71.0% of fishermen were interested in
using their vessels for purposes other than fishing. See JULIA OLSON & PATRICIA M. CLAY, AN
OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SURVEY ADMINISTERED DURING ROUND H OF THE
NORTHEAST MULTISPECLES FIsHERY DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, NOAA Technical
Memorandum NMFS-NE- 164 (2001), available at http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/publications/
tm/tm164 (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
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